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Abstract 
Education has been suggested as a ‘vaccine’ against HIV infection, but there 
is not much causal evidence behind this claim. Moreover, the few studies that 
exist on the impact of education on HIV infection and related outcomes have 
focused mostly on women, despite the fact that there are reasons to expect 
the responses of women and men to differ. This study analyses mechanisms 
that link education to HIV with a focus on gender differences, using data from 
four nationally representative surveys in Botswana. To estimate the casual 
effect, an exogenous one-year increase of junior secondary school is used, 
which in previous studies has been found to reduce HIV infection rates and 
increase incomes. The key finding is that women and men responded 
differently to the reform. It led to delayed sexual debut by up to a year among 
women and an increase in risky sex among men, measured by number of 
concurrent sexual partnerships and the likelihood of paying for sex. The 
increase in risky sex among men is likely to be due to the reform’s positive 
impact on income. The school reform reduced the likelihood of HIV infection 
among women, but had no statistically significant impact on this variable 
among men.  
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1. Introduction 
HIV infection rates are decreasing in most countries, but still, about 800 000 
individuals in Eastern and Southern Africa became infected in 2017 (UNAIDS 
2018a). Since provision of antiretroviral treatment to a rapidly growing number 
of HIV-positive citizens is a major challenge, the international efforts to deal 
with HIV instead need to focus more strongly on prevention. As a result, 
increased schooling has received a great deal of attention and is being 
described as a powerful prevention method (UNAIDS, 2015a, 2015b; United 
Nations, 2016; World Bank, 2016).  
In this paper, we analyse the links between education and HIV infection with 
an emphasis on gender differences.1 In both policy circles and the academic 
literature, the focus has previously been on the impact of education on women. 
Yet, according to theory, schooling may be linked to HIV through various 
channels with ambiguous aggregate effects, and these are likely to differ 
between women and men. Studying gender differences in sexual behaviour and 
HIV responses to schooling is important because the impact of education on 
men is of interest in itself and because they matter for HIV infection rates 
among both men and women, since men infect women and the other way 
around. 
A simple model of sexual behaviour guides the empirical analysis. One channel 
of HIV transmission is adolescent sexual behaviour. Schooling is predicted to 
affect adolescent sexual behaviour mainly because of the increased cost of 
pregnancy for women. Pregnancy is costly because it usually results in school 
dropout. Another channel of HIV transmission is adult sexual behaviour. 
Education is predicted to increase income, which in turn reduces the value of 
transfers of money or gifts to or from sex partners. Since the transfers usually 
are from men to women, men might increase their spending on risky sex while 
women reduce their supply of risky sex. Increased income also makes having 
children more affordable. However, it increases the opportunity cost of 
children for women. As a result, women may increase or decrease risky sex 
                                                          
1 Our analysis is limited to HIV transmission between men and women, since it accounts for 
the vast majority of HIV infections in Southern and Southeastern Africa. Although men who 
have sex with men comprise a high-risk group that contributes to the general epidemic, there 
is no nationally representative data on these individuals. 
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(that may lead to pregnancy) depending on the relative strength of the two 
effects. Men are expected to increase risky sex due to the income effect.  
To estimate casual effects, we exploit an education reform in Botswana, a high 
HIV prevalence country. The education reform, implemented in 1996, shifted 
the 10th year of education from senior secondary to junior secondary school. 
Since a large share of students finish their schooling after junior secondary 
school (40% in our data), the reform constituted a dramatic increase in the 
number of students completing ten instead of nine years of education. The 
reform also included some curricula changes and a shift in the location at which 
students completed their tenth year.  
Our identifying assumption is that nothing else affected children of relevant 
ages in 1996 in the same way as the school reform, i.e. there was nothing else 
that affected only those who would start secondary school after the 
implementation of the reform and not those who had already started or finished 
secondary school. Thus, as Borkum (2009) and De Neve et al. (2015), we 
assume that the education reform constituted an exogenous increase in the 
number of years of schooling.  
We use the reform to estimate the impacts of secondary education on 
adolescent and adult sexual behaviour for women and men, measured by age 
at first sex, concurrency (having more than one simultaneous sexual 
relationship) and transactional sex (reception or payment of money or gifts in 
exchange for sex). Since income is likely to be an important channel for adult 
sexual behaviour, we also estimate the impact on occupational skill level; we 
do not have data on income. Lastly, we estimate the impact on the likelihood 
of contracting an HIV infection.  
The data are from four Botswana AIDS Impact Surveys carried out in 2001, 
2004, 2008 and 2013. The Botswana AIDS Impact Surveys are nationally 
representative cross-sectional surveys with an individual and a household 
component. The 2004, 2008 and 2013 surveys include HIV testing of 
household members over the age of 9 year.2 One advantage of basing the study 
                                                          
2 In 2008, all children more than 18 months old were tested, and in 2013, all children more 
than 6 weeks old were tested.  
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on the Botswana school reform is that previous research suggests it should 
offer enough statistical power to identify an impact of education on HIV 
prevalence among both women and men (De Neve et al., 2015). 
The present paper builds on the work by De Neve et al. (2015), who estimate 
the impact of the Botswana education reform on the likelihood of HIV 
infection. However, there are some important differences between our analysis 
and theirs. First, we focus on gender differences and investigate a number of 
theoretically motivated links between education and HIV. Second, we use two 
different measures of exogenous exposure to the reform. Our simplest measure 
is similar to the one they use. It utilises information on whether an individual 
should have been exposed to the reform assuming that all pupils are in their 
perfect age-appropriate grade. However, as in other African countries, many 
children in Botswana are not in their age-appropriate grades. This implies that 
exposure to the reform increased gradually across birth cohorts, and 
consequently, there was no discrete jump in exposure to the reform between 
one birth cohort and another. Therefore, similar to Borkum (2009) and 
Chicoine (2012), and along the lines of Angrist and Lavy (2002), we also use 
the probability of exposure to the reform measured by the actual shares of girls 
and boys who were exposed to the reform in each birth cohort.  
Third, we include respondents who were 10–20 years old in 1996, while De 
Neve et al. (2015) also include younger and older birth cohorts. The restriction 
to respondents who were about to start secondary school in a year closer to the 
reform year is particularly important, as we want to identify gender-specific 
responses. HIV infection depends not only on own sexual behaviour, but also 
on the sexual behaviour of partners. And sexual behaviour, in turn, depends 
not only on own intentions, but also on the intentions of potential sex partners. 
A high correlation between exposure to the reform among the respondents and 
their (potential) sex partners therefore implies that the responses to the 
educational reform among sex partners probably have a large influence on the 
estimated effect, making it difficult to identify gender differences. Yet, because 
of age differences between sex partners, exposure to the education reform was 
not the same for sex partners as for the respondents themselves. Women tend 
to have older partners who were less likely than them to have been exposed to 
5 
 
the reform, while the opposite is true for men. The exception is young men, 
who tend to have partners of similar age. This implies that the reduced form 
effect of the reform on men’s age at sexual debut will be affected by the 
response of young women to the reform, i.e. it becomes more challenging to 
find a partner if women delay their sexual debut. With a narrower sample, the 
response to increased education among sex partners has less of an influence on 
the estimated effect. However, there is a trade-off between statistical power 
and closeness to the reform year, not least since there is not a discontinuous 
jump in exposure to the reform, but rather a gradual increase.  
Finally, compared with De Neve et al. (2015), we use two additional rounds of 
the Botswana AIDS Impact Survey. While they use only the 2004 and 2008 
surveys, we also include those from 2001 and 2013. The 2001 survey does not 
have data on HIV infection, but it does contain information about other 
outcomes of interest. The 2013 survey lacks data on years of schooling, but has 
useful information on educational attainment.   
Our key findings are as follows: The school reform delayed the sexual debut 
by about a year among women and possibly, depending on specification, a few 
months among men. It seems to have led to better jobs, i.e. an increase in 
occupational skill levels. Among men, there was an increase in concurrency 
and transactional sex, but no such changes were found among women. This 
impact on men’s risky sexual behaviour is most likely due to increased 
occupational skill levels and the resulting increase in income. As for the overall 
impact of education on HIV incidence, education seems to reduce the 
likelihood of contracting HIV among women, while no statistically significant 
effect was found for men.   
These results are supported by tests of the differences in responses between 
women and men, which are statistically significant for both measures of 
exposure for age at first sex, transactional sex and concurrency. However, there 
is no statistically significant gender difference in the effect on HIV infection 
rates. This is due to the relatively large standard errors of the estimates, 
particularly for men. 
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Our HIV results partly diverge from those presented by De Neve et al. (2015), 
who find a reduced HIV infection rate also among men. We show that their 
finding is driven by the inclusion of more age cohorts in the estimation sample.  
Our study contributes to the literature on the potential links between education 
or schooling and sexual behaviour in developing countries. As documented by 
Hardee et al. (2014), a dozen of studies find a negative association between 
schooling and the risk of HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa. A few of them 
employ strategies to identify a causal effect of education on HIV (Alsan and 
Cutler, 2013; Agüero and Bharadwaj, 2014; De Neve et al., 2015; Durevall et 
al., 2019). Among these, De Neve et al. (2015) provide the most convincing 
evidence of a casual effect, and it is the only study that includes both men and 
women. Using the Botswana school reform as an instrument, they find that one 
more year of secondary schooling reduced the risk of HIV infection by 8 
percentage points (12 for women and 5 for men), which should be compared 
with a baseline prevalence rate of 25.5%. Among the other studies, Alsan and 
Cutler (2013) only investigate age at first sex among women in Uganda and 
link age at first sex to HIV infections with model simulations. Agüero and 
Bharadwaj (2014) analyse and find an impact on Zimbabwean women’s 
number of sex partners and HIV knowledge, but no statistically significant 
effect of education on HIV infections.3 And Durevall et al. (2019) fail to find 
a causal effect of current school attendance among young women in South 
Africa.  
Our study also contributes to the literature on the impact of education on related 
issues. Chicoine (2012) finds that schooling delays marriage and increases 
early use of modern contraceptives among women in Ethiopia. Several studies 
find that schooling reduces or delays child bearing (Breierova and Duflo, 2004; 
Osili and Long, 2008; Baird et al., 2011; Chicoine, 2012; Duflo et al., 2014; 
Dinçer, 2016; Chicoine, 2016; Keats, 2018). Yet another finding is that 
increased schooling is likely to raise incomes (Borkum, 2009), which in turn 
has been found to reduce sexual risk-taking among women and increase such 
                                                          
3 They argue that this is due to a lack of statistical power.  
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behaviour among men (Kohler and Thornton, 2011; Robinson and Yeh, 2011; 
Burke et al., 2015).   
The following section outlines the theoretical framework, while Appendix I 
gives a detailed description of the formal model. Section 3 describes the 
education reform and Section 4 provides information about the data and the 
empirical approach. Section 5 reports the results and Section 6 concludes the 
paper.   
  
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
We investigate two specific links between education and HIV infection by 
gender: adolescent sexual behaviour and adult sexual behaviour. To this aim, 
we have developed a simple model to guide the empirical analysis (see 
Appendix I). Here we describe the model intuitively, relate it to earlier 
economic models of education and HIV transmission, and discuss empirical 
support of model assumptions and predictions. 
Economists typically assume that people engage in activates if the marginal 
benefits of doing so exceed the marginal costs. Models of risky sex and HIV 
infection are no exception (Philipson and Posner, 1995; Kremer, 1996; 
Magruder, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2013; Duflo et al., 2015; Yao, 2016).4 
Initially, the models of risky sex did not distinguish between men and women 
and were therefore criticised for lacking a gender perspective (Christensen, 
1998). Examples of single-gender models are Philipson and Posner (1995) and 
Kremer (1996). Some later models bring in the gender dimension but consider 
only women, treating male partners’ behaviour as exogenous (Duflo et al., 
2015; Yao, 2016). The general equilibrium model by Greenwood et al. (2013) 
stands out in modelling the sexual behaviour of both men and women. In this 
model, transfers5 from men to women ‘clear markets’ for different types of 
sexual relationships.  
                                                          
4 In the models developed by economists, sexual behaviour is endogenous, and this is the 
main factor that distinguishes them from most epidemiological models of HIV transmission, 
as they usually treat sexual behaviour as exogenous (Greenwood et al., 2013). 
5 Transfers can encompass everything from an explicit exchange of money or gifts for sex to 
economic support and transfers between spouses. 
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Transfers from male sex partners are also important components of models 
focusing on women only (Duflo et al., 2015; Yao, 2016). There is compelling 
empirical evidence of transfers from male to female sex partners in Southern 
and Eastern African countries (Tawfik and Watkins, 2007; Stoebenau et al., 
2016). Moreover, Robinson and Yeh (2011) document larger transfers for 
riskier sex and the use of transactional sex as a coping strategy to deal with 
income shocks in Kenya. In our model, riskier sex implies higher transfers. A 
larger transfer for riskier sex implies that men have a higher preference for 
risky sex and/or that they respond less than women to the risks involved in such 
behaviour. There are a couple of explanations for why this might be the case. 
Men will typically bear little or none of the costs of unwanted pregnancies. In 
addition, norms of masculinity usually endorse risk-taking (Barker and 
Ricardo, 2005). Arunachalam and Shah (2013) show that there is a price 
premium on risky (condomless) sex in sex markets even if men are concerned 
about and respond to risks, as long as they respond less than the women. 
Both Duflo et al. (2015) and Yao (2016) make a distinction between committed 
and casual sexual relationships in adolescence. Committed sexual relationships 
have a higher likelihood of pregnancy (and pregnancy and marriage are 
important aims of the relationships), while casual sexual relationships have a 
higher risk of HIV infection (transfers from male partners is an important 
motive for these relationships). Even if the probabilities of pregnancy and HIV 
infection differ between the types of relationships, unprotected sex can result 
in both outcomes in both types; in fact, Yao (2016) finds that pregnancy 
motives in committed sexual relationships are likely to be an important driver 
of the HIV epidemic. 
Our model includes the most relevant aspects of the above-mentioned models, 
with a focus on gender-specific hypotheses. Men and women engage in risky 
sex if the perceived marginal benefit of doing so exceeds the perceived 
marginal cost. However, the costs and benefits are likely to differ between the 
genders because women bear a higher cost of pregnancies, because the utility 
of risky sex could differ between the genders and because any transfers 
involved are from men to women. Thus, risky sex yields direct utility but also 
leads to transfers from men to women and increased probabilities of HIV 
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infection and pregnancy. One potentially important simplification is that we 
consider only one type of risky sex, i.e. we do not distinguish between 
relationships with a high risk of HIV transmission and those with a high 
probability of pregnancy.6  
The model has two periods, adolescence and adulthood, with potentially 
important differences in the impact of education on risky sex. We describe 
these briefly here: 
Adolescent sexual behaviour 
A clear prediction is that adolescent women have an incentive to reduce 
unprotected sex to avoid pregnancy during the extra school year. There is 
ample empirical support that pregnancy is followed by school dropout 
(Meekers and Ahmed, 1999; Bandiera et al., 2017). Getting pregnant during 
the extra time spent in school is costly both because women who drop out leave 
without a junior certificate and because they miss any potential returns to the 
extra year. There are studies showing that increased education is likely to delay 
childbearing in African and other countries (Osili and Long, 2008; Baird et al., 
2011; Chicoine, 2012; Duflo et al., 2014).  
There could also be other effects of being in school. Black et al. (2008) discuss 
an ‘incarceration effect’, which encompasses the motive to avoid pregnancies 
while in school, but it also includes additional effects that school attendance 
can have on sexual behaviour. One example is the impact on social networks, 
which in turn could affect sexual behaviour and partner choice.  
The model in the appendix points to yet some other potentially important 
predictions: If being in school reduces the available current income, the value 
of transfers increases. As mentioned earlier, Duflo et al. (2015) and Yao (2016) 
suggest that additional years in school can therefore be associated with a 
relative shift from committed to casual sexual relationships for women. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to study this possibility with our data. The 
                                                          
6 We do not consider this distinction since we are not able to empirically distinguish between 
the two types of sexual relationships. 
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prediction for men is that reduced current income should lead to fewer sexual 
relationships that involve transfers to women.  
Adulthood sexual behaviour 
In the model, the sexual behaviour of adults is affected through improved 
income. Borkum (2009) has previously shown that incomes responded to the 
education reform in Botswana, which makes the link between education and 
HIV transmission that works through income relevant. The impact of higher 
income on adult sexual behaviour differs by gender. Increases in income make 
men able to afford more transactional sex, while the transfers from men to 
women become less valuable for women. This should increase sexual risk-
taking among men and decrease it among women. Higher income also has 
implications for the motive to have children. With higher income, women and 
men can afford more children. However, it also implies an increased 
opportunity cost of childbearing and childrearing for women. Since the 
opportunity cost is arguably higher for women than for men, women should 
reduce their engagement in risky sex more than men in response to the change 
in opportunity cost. Some studies have suggested such a gender-differentiated 
sexual behaviour response to income shocks in the region (Bryceson and 
Fonseca, 2006; Kohler and Thornton, 2011; Burke et al., 2015).  
While not being part of the model, an increase in expected income has been 
suggested to also increase the value of expected life years. This should make 
both women and men reduce their risky sexual behaviour in a context where 
the risk of HIV infection is high and contracting the virus can reduce life 
expectancy. Although the risk of HIV infection is high in the Botswana 
context, the extent to which HIV infection reduces life expectancy has 
decreased since the expansion of anti-retroviral treatment from 2004 and 
onwards. Anyhow, the life-expectancy effect should be similar for men and 
women.7  
                                                          
7 Education could also affect sexual behaviour and HIV infection through improved 
knowledge, but again there is no reason to expect the impact to differ between women and 
men.  
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2.1 Testing of specific hypotheses  
In accordance with the model in Appendix I, we investigate two specific links 
between education and HIV: adolescent and adult sexual behaviour. We test 
adolescent sexual behaviour using information on age at first sex. This 
information was collected retrospectively for all participants in the first three 
survey rounds. It should be noted that age at first sex is a limited description 
of adolescent sexual behaviour. For example, an individual can be committed 
to one partner or have several casual relationships, an aspect that we cannot 
investigate with the data at hand.8   
We consider two types of adult sexual behaviours, both of which have been 
suggested as important drivers of the HIV epidemic: concurrent sexual 
relationships, here called concurrency, and reception or payment of money or 
gifts in exchange for sex, i.e. transactional sex. Concurrency has been 
suggested to be common in countries with high HIV prevalence, and to 
substantially increase the spread of HIV compared with serial monogamy with 
the same total number of sex partners (Shelton, 2009). The reason for this is 
that it increases the likelihood of having sex with someone else soon after being 
infected, when the viral load is particularly high. We measure concurrency 
using a binary variable that is equal to one if the respondents state that they 
currently have more than one sex partner.  
Transactional sex has also been suggested to be common in high-HIV 
prevalence countries and to contribute to the spread of HIV through its 
connection to concurrency (Stoebenau et al., 2016). We measure transactional 
sex using a binary variable that is equal to one if the respondents state that they 
have received or given gifts or money in exchange for sex. 
According to our theoretical framework, adult sexual behaviour is affected 
mainly through the impact of education on a person’s earning potential. In our 
data, we do not observe income or wages, but we do have detailed information 
on occupations. We therefore test whether the education reform affected the 
                                                          
8 There is information on protection at first sex, but it is difficult to interpret the use of 
protection without knowledge about who the sex partner is and the type of contraceptives 
used. While condoms are protective, all else equal, they are more likely to be used in casual 
than in committed relationships.  
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skill level of occupations. As mentioned, Borkum, (2009) found positive 
income effects of the Botswana education reform.  
 
3. The education reform 
The education system in Botswana consists of seven years of primary 
education and five years of secondary education. The five secondary years are 
divided into junior and senior secondary school. Before the reform, junior 
secondary school lasted two years and senior secondary school three years. The 
political goal is that everybody should finish junior secondary school, while 
senior secondary school is seen as preparatory for tertiary education. 
Consequently, a large share of students finish their schooling after the junior 
secondary school level (41.12% did so in our estimation sample, 44.42% of the 
women and 37.13% of the men). Due to a perception that two years of 
secondary schooling was not enough to prepare students for work or further 
training, the education system was reformed from a 7+2+3 year to a 7+3+2year 
system, such that the 10th school year was shifted from senior to junior 
secondary school. The policy affected students entering secondary school in 
1996 or later.  
In addition to an increased number of students attending the 10th year, there 
was a change in the location where students attend the 10th year and of the 
teachers who teach it. To accommodate the increased number of students at 
junior secondary schools, new classrooms were built and new teachers hired at 
existing junior secondary schools. Access to junior secondary school seems to 
have been unaffected by the policy reform, and due to the existing capacity, 
there does not seem to have been a decline in quality (Borkum, 2009).  
A shift of the 10th grade from the first year in senior secondary school to the 
last year in junior secondary school unavoidably involved some curricular 
changes, especially for the 10th year. In particular, there was an aim to make 
the curricula more relevant to the labour market, implying a broadening of 
course offerings to include technical and business subjects. However, the effect 
of the curricular changes are likely to be of secondary importance compared 
with the additional year of study (Borkum, 2009).  
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The school reform led to a substantial increase in the number of students 
completing ten years of education. Among those born 1976–1979 (who were 
largely unaffected by the reform), 49.31% completed 9 years of education or 
less; for those born 1983–1986 (who were largely exposed to the reform), the 
corresponding figure is 22.89 per cent. Figure 1 shows detailed information on 
the shares of the two age groups who finished their schooling after each grade. 
As can be seen, there was a clear shift from a norm of finishing school after 9th 
grade to one of finishing school after 10th grade.  
Figure 1. Highest completed grades (at the time of the survey) by age in 1996 
 
 
4. Data and empirical strategy 
4.1 Data 
The Botswana AIDS Impact Surveys (BAISs) were carried out in 2001, 2004, 
2008 and 2013. They are nationally representative cross-sectional surveys 
with an individual and a household component. The focus is on HIV, and the 
data contain, for example, self-reported sexual behaviour and HIV status 
based on blood samples. There is also information on socioeconomic factors 
such as education, occupation and labour market participation. Each survey 
consists of between 4,500 (2001) and 14, 000 (2008) observations. Figure 2 
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shows the age distribution of the sample in 1996. As can be seen, the 
distribution is fairly uniform. 
Figure 2: Distribution of the estimation sample across age in 1996 
 
Table 1 shows summary statistics by gender for the dependent variables and 
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surveys contain information about each dependent variable, and gives a 
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occupational categories as an alternative measure, and arrived at essentially the 
same results.9 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (10–20 year olds in 1996) 
 Women Men 
Surveys containing the 
dependent variable  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N 
Dependent variables       
Age at first sex 18.297 2.357 4,363 18.266 2.979 3,152 2001, 2004, 2008 
Concurrency 0.080 0.272 4,042 0.189 0.392 3,214 2004, 2008 
Transactional sex 0.016 0.127 4,932 0.022 0.147 3,796 2001, 2004, 2008, 2013 
HIV status 0.332 0.471 4,616 0.167 0.373 3,609 2004, 2008, 2013 
Skilled occupation 0.705 0.456 2,799 0.765 0.424 3,282 2001, 2004, 2008, 2013 
Further description of the sample      
Age in years 26.602 4.848 6,274 26.752 4.933 5,112  
Never attended formal 
education 0.036 0.186 6,003 0.067 0.250 4,759  
At least some primary 
education 0.102 0.302 6,003 0.135 0.342 4,759  
At least some secondary 
education 0.686 0.464 6,003 0.581 0.493 4,759  
At least some tertiary 
education 0.176 0.381 6,003 0.217 0.412 4,759  
2001 survey dummy 0.086 0.280 6,274 0.086 0.281 5,112   
2004 survey dummy 0.308 0.462 6,274 0.292 0.455 5,112  
2008 survey dummy 0.383 0.486 6,274 0.376 0.484 5,112  
2013 survey dummy 0.223 0.416 6,274 0.245 0.430 5,112  
 
4.2 Exposure probabilities 
The school year in Botswana starts in January, and the calendar-year system is 
used to determine when a child should start first grade. An individual was 
exposed to the reform if he or she was eligible to enter secondary school in 
1996 or later. We do not know with certainty whether each respondent was 
exposed to the reform or not for two reasons. Most importantly, as is typical in 
sub-Saharan African countries, many children are not in their age-appropriate 
grade in Botswana. Both delayed school entry and repetitions are common, and 
there are children who start school early. Hence, the relationship between age 
in 1996 (or birth year) and grade in 1996 is far from perfect. However, the 
individual variation in grade in 1996 is likely to be strongly correlated with 
ability and other unobserved factors that matter for schooling, and potentially 
also for sexual behaviour. This makes individual grade in 1996 endogenous 
                                                          
9 These results are available on request. 
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and therefore unsuitable for identification anyway. Instead, we use only the 
variation in exposure to the reform that depends on the arguably external 
factors, gender and age in 1996.  
The other reason we do not know which grades the respondents were eligible 
to enter in 1996 is that the BAIS data only contains information on age at the 
time of survey collection, not birth date. The BAIS surveys were collected at 
different times from 22 January to 31 July.10 Hence, some respondents had 
already had their birthday in that year while others had not. This implies that 
each individual has two possible ages in the beginning of 1996. We use the 
mid-day of the survey collection to compute the probability that respondents 
already have had their birthday. More specifically, to calculate the exposure 
probability, let pr𝑎𝑎96 be the probability that the respondent’s birthday was after 
the date of the survey, and let pr𝑎𝑎96−1 be the probability that the respondent’s 
birthday was before the date of the survey. Then with probability pr𝑎𝑎96, the 
age at 1 January 1996 was the same as the age in 1996 at the date of the survey, 
and with probability pr𝑎𝑎96−1 it was one year less than at the time of the survey. 
We use two measures of exposure probability that contain different degrees of 
exogenous variation in the probability that someone was exposed to the reform. 
The simplest measure is based on the age-appropriate grade of the respondent. 
This measure is similar to the one used by De Neve et al. (2015).11 The 
respondent should have been exposed to the reform if born in 1981 or later (if 
turning 14 or less in 1996). Let 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗  be the probability that the respondent (j) has 
been exposed to the reform depending on birth year/age in 1996, where 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 =0 for a respondent who turned 15 or more in 1996 and 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 = 1 for the younger 
ones. The exposure probability is then: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸1 = pr𝑎𝑎96−1 ∗ 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗−1 + pr𝑎𝑎96 ∗ 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 . 
                                                          
10 The first and second surveys were collected 12 February–31 July, the third 19 May–30 
May and the fourth 22 January –22 April. 
11 Our measure differs slightly from theirs in how we deal with the fact that we only know 
age in years, but not the birthdays of respondents. De Neve et al. (2015) assume that current 
age is reported age plus 0.5, and use this to compute birth year.  
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Most respondents have an exposure probability of either zero or one. However, 
since each respondent has two possible birth years, a small number of them 
have a probability between zero and one.  
This exposure probability can be criticised for not reflecting the fact that many 
children are not in their age-appropriate grade, implying that there was no sharp 
cut-off between age cohorts that were or were not exposed to the reform. 
Instead, exposure to the reform increased gradually across birth cohorts. This 
makes the measure of exposure an imprecise proxy of true exposure to the 
reform. One solution, which for example Agüero and Bharadwaj (2014) use, 
is to keep only birth cohorts whose exposure probability was close to either 
zero or one in the sample, removing the in-between cohorts. However, this 
implies that we disregard useful information in the data and that the birth 
cohorts that are compared with each other are more dissimilar than necessary, 
as they are far apart in time. A more appropriate approach would be to make 
use of the continuous variation in exposure probability for the birth cohorts, 
which allows us to both keep useful information and compare cohorts of 
similar age.  
Our second measure does this. It is therefore similar to the measure used by 
Borkum (2009), who studies the impact of grade structure reforms in Botswana 
on wages,12 and Chicoine (2012), who studies the impact of a Kenyan grade 
structure reform on fertility.13 Conceptually, it is akin to Angrist and Lavy 
(2002), who use estimated probabilities of treatment in their analysis of the 
impact of class size on student performance in Israel. We use the actual shares 
of children of different ages and gender who attended certain grades as reported 
in the 1995 Education Statistics, 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘, where k indicates gender. To be more 
precise, it is the share of each age group enrolled in any of the primary school 
                                                          
12 Borkum (2009) uses information on school entry age from Education Statistics reports 
published by Botswana Statistical Office. Since he uses entry age, he has to make assumptions 
about grade progress. He probably uses school entry age instead of the age distribution in 
different grades because he studies two reforms and there is less data available from the year 
preceding the earlier reform.  
13 Chicoine (2012) uses information on school entry ages and repetition rates. The age 
distribution at different grades is of course a more direct measure, when available.  
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grades in 1995.14 These probabilities will be between 0 and 1. To connect them 
to respondents in BAIS, we again have to take into account that each 
respondent had two possible ages on 1 January 1996. The second exposure 
probability is then: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2 = pr𝑎𝑎96−1 ∗ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗−1,𝑘𝑘 + pr𝑎𝑎96 ∗ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘. 
Figures 3 shows the two measures of exposure probabilities as a function of 
women’s age in 1996.15 It is apparent that the window around 15 years cannot 
be too narrow for it to be possible to identify an effect that is different from a 
linear trend. However, the more age groups we include, the less similar they 
are likely to be. 
 
Figure 3. Treatment probabilities for women measured by 
Exposure 1 and Exposure 2 
   
4.3 Identification strategy 
The probabilities of exposure described above are our treatment variables. We 
thus estimate the impact of the education reform (the intent to treat, ITT) rather 
                                                          
14 To compute the share of a certain age and gender group enrolled in primary school, the 
information in the Education Statistics reports was combined with population projections by 
age and gender. The population projection is available for 1996, so we reduced the age in the 
age groups by one year. In two age-gender groups, the number of enrolled students in primary 
and secondary schools were larger than the corresponding population cohorts. In these cases, 
we divided the students in the relevant age cohorts enrolled in primary school by the sum of 
students enrolled in primary and secondary school.  
15 The graph for men looks very similar and is available from the authors on request.  
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than the impact of an extra school year. We prefer reduced-form impacts of the 
reform instead of IV estimates of years of schooling for two reasons. First, 
although the most visible and important effect of the reform was that it 
substantially increased the number of students who attended a 10th year of 
education, this is not the only effect. The reform came with some unavoidable 
changes e.g. in curricula, in the location at which some students attended their 
10th year (at a nearby junior secondary school instead of a more distant senior 
secondary school) and in the teachers who taught the 10th year. There was also 
an aim to make the curricula more relevant to and useful in the labour market. 
By estimating the reduced form effect, we remain open to the possibility that 
part of the impact of the reform may be due to other factors than an increase in 
the number of years of education. Second, estimating the intent to treat has the 
additional advantage that we can use the fourth survey, collected in 2013, 
which does not contain information on years of education (it does include more 
detailed information on completed levels of education but we do not know if 
someone who completed junior secondary school did it in nine or ten years).  
We report all of our results for both exposure probabilities. The second 
measure, which utilises information on actual age-grade attendance patterns, 
should be more precise than the measure that assumes a sharp cut-off. Since 
we have several surveys, we can control flexibly for current age of the 
respondent with a full set of age dummies. This is important since all the 
outcomes are age dependent. We also control for a continuous effect of age in 
1996, which captures trends in the outcome variables over time. We control for 
these trends using a linear term only, a linear and a quadratic term, or survey 
dummies. In addition, we include district fixed effects. We estimate separate 
regressions for women and men. In the main analysis, we use linear regression. 
Since four of the outcome variables are binary, we estimate logit regressions 
for these as robustness checks. Our main specification is: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, (1) 
where y is the outcome for individual i in age cohort j and district d, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 
is the probability that an individual is exposed to the reform, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is a vector 
of age dummies, 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 are birth year controls and 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑 are district dummies.  
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As mentioned, the more age cohorts born long before or after 1981 we include, 
the more dissimilar the people we compare become. On the other hand, 
including more age cohorts increases the statistical power and our ability to 
identify an impact of the reform when controlling for a continuous cohort trend 
(see Figure 3). In our main estimations, we include three cohorts with a zero 
or close to zero probability of exposure, three cohorts with a close to one 
probability of exposure, and five cohorts with a gradual increase in exposure 
probability. In our robustness analysis, we increase and decrease the window 
by one year at each end.16  
Given the continuous cohort controls and the age controls, our identifying 
assumption is that nothing else happened that affected sexual behaviour and 
HIV infection rates across age-cohorts in the same way as the school reform. 
The main threat would be other changes in secondary school. As most high-
HIV-prevalence countries, Botswana has introduced so-called life skills 
education, which includes HIV/AIDS knowledge, sex education and 
discussions about relationships. However, the policy was developed in 1998 
and implemented after that, so it did not coincide with the school reform. 
Initially, the teaching consisted of one-off lessons about biomedical facts, and, 
as in many other countries, teachers lacked teaching methods and were 
uncomfortable discussing the topic, making the initiative a failure (Gachuhi, 
1999). A teacher-capacity training programme was launched first in 2004. In 
fact, a general conclusion drawn by UNAIDS is that adolescents and young 
adults have been ‘largely neglected and left behind by the national HIV 
response’ (UNAIDS, 2018b). It also seems unlikely that other parts of the 
national HIV response affected age cohorts in the same way as the school 
reform. The initial national response to the HIV epidemic in the late 1980s was 
prompt, but by the mid-1990s, the efforts had lost steam, and it was not until 
early 2000, with the provision of free anti-retroviral drugs and the introduction 
                                                          
16 If we were to increase the window much more, we would include people who went to 
school when junior high school lasted three years and senior high school lasted two years, 
which is the same as for those exposed to the 1996 education reform. Moreover, if we were 
to decrease the window much more, it would be almost impossible to identify an effect of the 
reform while also controlling for a continuous cohort trend, as evident from Figure 3.  
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of routine HIV testing, that the government made HIV/AIDS a priority for the 
country (Allen and Heald, 2004).  
 
4.4 Exposure to the reform among potential sex partners 
People’s sexual behaviour does not depend on own intentions alone but also 
on potential sex partners. The same is true for HIV infection. We estimate 
reduced form effects of the education reform, which include possible effects 
among potential sex partners. If potential sex partners are affected by the 
reform in a similar way as ‘treated’ individuals, the impact of the education 
reform will be strengthened. 
If we instead believe that women and men respond differently, there should be 
weaker effects. It could even be a challenge to identify gender differences. Put 
differently, our estimated gender differences are likely to be less than what they 
would have been in the thought experiment where only women or only men, 
but not their potential sex partners, were exposed to the reform. For example, 
if the reform increases men’s sexual risk-taking, the impact might be muted if 
the reform has the opposite effect on their potential female sex partners. 
Similarly, if women are less interested in transactional sex for given levels of 
transfers, they may still not decrease transactional sex if men offer them larger 
transfers. While we have limited information on sex partners, and even less on 
the full set of potential partners, we do know the age of the most recent sex 
partner. This can be used to get an idea about the influence of the potential 
partners of the opposite sex on our estimated overall effects.17  
Figure 4 below shows the average age difference between women and men of 
different ages and their most recent sex partner. A women’s average sex partner 
is approximately five years older than her, and this age difference is fairly 
stable across age. The men tend to have younger sex partners. However, in 
contrast to women, the age difference increases gradually with own age: for 
18-year-old men the age difference is around -0.5 years, while it is almost -5 
years for 33-year-old men. For the women, this implies there is little variation 
                                                          
17 Given the paucity of information, it is a challenge to estimate the influence of (potential) 
sex partners at the individual level.  
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in exposure status of potential partners, since most of their partners are not 
exposed to the school reform. As a result, the estimated effect of increased 
schooling for the women is unlikely to be greatly influenced by a change in the 
behaviour of their male sex partners. Among the men, there is a difference 
between young and old men. The older ones in our sample should have partners 
who were exposed to the reform, but the young men should have a mixture of 
partners where some were exposed to the reform and others were not. This 
implies that the estimated effect of increased schooling for men is likely to be 
somewhat influenced by changed behaviour of their partners, in particular 
when we estimate the impact on age at first sex, since the sexual debut is likely 
to have occurred at a relatively young age with a woman of similar age. 
 
Figure 4: Average age difference between women and men of 
different ages and their most recent sex partner  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Main results 
This section first analyses the impact of increased schooling on adolescent and 
adult sexual behaviour separately for women and for men. Then it analyses 
how schooling affects HIV prevalence, and finally it tests whether differences 
between men and women are statistically significant. We report the estimated 
impact of being exposed to the reform (i.e. the intent to treat) from regressions 
using the two measures of exposure: Exposure 1, a sharp cut-off in 1996, and 
Exposure 2, a measure of the probability of being exposed to the reform based 
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on the gender and age distribution across school years in 1996. All regressions 
have a full set of age dummies, district fixed effects and cohort trends using a 
linear term, a quadratic term or survey dummies.18 
Table 2 reports the impact on the age at first sex. There is strong evidence that 
the school reform delayed women’s first sex: all the estimates are significant 
at the 1% level. The delay is about 13 months when our preferred measure, 
Exposure 2, is used and 7 months when Exposure 1 is used. The results for 
men are weaker – the estimates vary from 0.017 to 0.351 – and they are not 
statistically significant. 
Table 2: The impact of the school reform on age at first sex 
 Women  Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure 1  0.626*** 0.612*** 0.627*** 0.017 0.029 0.038 
 (0.112) (0.091) (0.121) (0.189) (0.194) (0.184) 
N 4,009 4,009 4,009 2,889 2,889 2,889 
Exposure 2  1.117*** 1.114*** 1.137*** 0.333 0.347 0.351 
 (0.139) (0.160) (0.119) (0.453) (0.458) (0.363) 
N 4,009 4,009 4,009 2,889 2,889 2,889 
Control for 
age in 1996 
Linear 
trend 
Quadrat. 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Linear 
trend 
Quadrat. 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Notes: Exposure 1 assumes that everyone was in their age-appropriate grade at the time of 
the reform, and Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of 
being exposed to the reform based on age and gender in 1996. All regressions have a full set 
of age dummies and district fixed effects. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the 
birth year. Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 report the results for concurrency and transactional sex, 
respectively. There is no indication that schooling affects these factors among 
women; all coefficients are small, negative and statistically insignificant. Men, 
on the other hand, seem to have more concurrent partners if exposed to the 
school reform, and they clearly have more transactional sex. Exposure to the 
reform increases the probability of having more than one partner among men 
by roughly 14 percentage points when we use Exposure 2 and 7 percentage 
points when we use Exposure 1 (Table 3). The probability of transactional sex 
increases by 2 to 5 percentage points (Table 4).  
 
  
                                                          
18 The complete results are available from the authors on request. 
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Table 3: The impact of the school reform on concurrency 
 Women  Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure 1  -0.025 -0.027 -0.025 0.074* 0.068** 0.074* 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.039) (0.027) (0.039) 
N 3,738 3,738 3,738 2,973 2,973 2,973 
Exposure 2  -0.027 -0.038 -0.027 0.143* 0.139** 0.143* 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.066) (0.044) (0.066) 
N 3,738 3,738 3,738 2,973 2,973 2,973 
Control for 
age in 1996 
Linear 
trend 
Quadrat. 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Linear 
trend 
Quadrat. 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Notes: Exposure 1 assumes that everyone was in their age-appropriate grade at the time of 
the reform, and Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of 
being exposed to the reform based on age and gender in 1996. Standard errors, in 
parentheses, are clustered at the birth year. Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 4: The impact of the school reform on transactional sex 
 Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure 1  0.002 0.001 0.003 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
N 4,534 4,534 4,534 3,485 3,485 3,485 
Exposure 2  0.013 0.009 0.011 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
N 4,534 4,534 4,534 3,485 3,485 3,485 
Control for 
age in 1996 
Linear 
trend 
Quadrat. 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Linear 
trend 
Quadrat. 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Notes: Notes: Exposure 1 assumes that everyone was in their age-appropriate grade at the time 
of the reform, and Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of being 
exposed to the reform based on age and gender in 1996.Standard errors, in parentheses, are 
clustered at the birth year. Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 5 shows the impact of the school reform on having a skilled occupation. 
For women, all estimates are positive but only two are significant (at the 10% 
level). For men, all but one of the estimates are statistically significant. Thus, 
the results for men are in line with an impact on adult sexual behaviour through 
income.  
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Table 5: The impact of the school reform on having a skilled occupation 
 Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure 1  0.034 0.036 0.035 0.089*** 0.076*** 0.092*** 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
N 2,533 2,533 2,533 2,982 2,982 2,982 
Exposure 2  0.077* 0.091 0.074* 0.108* 0.094** 0.105 
 (0.039) (0.059) (0.037) (0.055) (0.042) (0.059) 
N 2,533 2,533 2,533 2,982 2,982 2,982 
Control for 
age in 1996 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Notes: Exposure 1 assumes that everyone was in their age-appropriate grade at the time of 
the reform, and Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of 
being exposed to the reform based on age and gender in 1996. Standard errors, in parentheses, 
are clustered at the birth year. Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01. The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 for the three highest skill groups 
according to ILO’s ISCO ranking.   
Table 6 presents estimated effects of the school reform on HIV infection. For 
women there is quite a large protective effect. The size of the estimated effect 
varies considerably depending on exposure measure: for Exposure 2 it is about 
10 percentage points and for Exposure 1 about 6 percentage points. This can 
be compared with an average HIV infection rate of 33% (see Table 1) in the 
estimation sample. The estimated effect on men’s HIV infection is much 
smaller and not statistically significant.  
Table 6: The impact of the school reform on HIV infection 
 Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure 1  -0.065** -0.062** -0.065** -0.021 -0.015 -0.022 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.018) (0.011) (0.016) 
N 4,288 4,288 4,288 3,348 3,348 3,348 
Exposure 2  -0.101* -0.095* -0.098* -0.039 -0.036 -0.039 
 (0.048) (0.050) (0.049) (0.030) (0.020) (0.029) 
N 4,288 4,288 4,288 3,348 3,348 3,348 
Control for 
age in 1996 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Notes: Exposure 1 assumes that everyone was in their age-appropriate grade at the time of the 
reform, and Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of being 
exposed to the reform based on age and gender in 1996. All regressions have a full set of age 
dummies and district fixed effects. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the birth 
year. Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
A key finding this far is that the effects of the school reform appear to differ 
between women and men, so in the next step we test whether these differences 
are statistically significant. To do so we estimate fully interacted models, 
where a female dummy is interacted with all explanatory variables, on the 
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pooled sample of men and women. Table 7 reports the interaction term between 
exposure to the reform and the female dummy for all three exposure measures. 
Since the results are largely stable across specifications with a linear or 
quadratic cohort trend or survey year controls, we only report estimates with a 
linear age in 1996 control to save space. 
Women seem to delay first sex more than men as a result of the reform. There 
is also a statistically significant difference in concurrency and transactional sex 
between women and men. Although the probability of having a skilled 
occupation increases more for men than for women, this difference is not 
statistically significant. Finally, while the estimates of the impact on HIV 
infection indicate a much larger effect on women than men, the difference is 
not statistically significant. The reason is that the standard errors of the 
estimates are relatively large.  
Table 7: Testing the statistical significance of gender differences 
 
First sex  Concurrency  Transactional sex  
Skilled 
occupation  HIV 
Exposure 1  0.609*** -0.099** -0.025** -0.055 -0.044 
 (0.192) (0.032) (0.009) (0.039) (0.037) 
N 6,898 6,711 8,019 5,515 7,636 
Exposure 2  0.784* -0.169*** -0.039** -0.030 -0.061 
 (0.391) (0.050) (0.016) (0.074) (0.067) 
N 6,898 6,711 8,019 5,515 7,636 
Control for 
age in 1996 Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Notes: All models are fully interacted. They include a full set of age dummies, district fixed 
effects, one exposure model, a female dummy and interaction terms between the female dummy 
and all other variables. Only the interaction terms between the exposure measure and the female 
dummy are reported in the table. Exposure 1 assumes that everyone was in their age-appropriate 
grade at the time of the reform, and Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the 
probability of being exposed to the reform based on age and gender in 1996. Significance levels 
are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
5.2 Robustness checks 
In our first set of robustness checks, we evaluate ‘placebo reforms’, where we 
shift the timing of the reform back and forth in time. For Exposure 1, we still 
assume perfect age-appropriate grade placement for all pupils. For Exposure 2 
we assume that the gender and age distributions in different grades were the 
same at the end of 1991 as at the end of 1995, i.e. we still use the gender and 
age distributions in different grades from the 1995 Education Statistics report 
to compute probabilities of exposure to the reform. We first pretend that the 
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reform occurred three years earlier than it actually did, i.e. in 1993. We then 
estimate the impact of fictional reforms occurring two years earlier, one year 
later, two years later and three years later than the actual reform. For 
comparison, we also report the estimated impact of the actual reform. To avoid 
having a very small number of exposed and unexposed individuals, we expand 
the window to include the 9–21 year olds in the sample. The results are 
presented in Figures A1–A10 in Appendix II.  
The expectation is to find the strongest effect at the time of the reform, and that 
the effect fades away as we move away from the year of the reform. This 
pattern is clearly confirmed in all cases except concurrency and transactional 
sex among men, for which the effects peak one year later and one year earlier, 
respectively. Nevertheless, even in these cases the effects decline for fictional 
reform years further away from 1996. In general, fictional reforms are also less 
statistically significant as we move away from the actual reform year, but for 
men’s concurrency there are statistically significant coefficients of opposite 
sign at t-3  
In our next set of robustness checks, we re-estimate all regressions using a 
sample window that was one year wider (age 9–21 in 1996) and one year 
narrower (age 11–19 in 1996) than in the main analysis. The estimated effects 
are reported in Tables A1–A6 in Appendix II. 
Let us start with the wider window. All effects that are statistically significant 
in the main analysis remain so. The point estimates are somewhat larger but 
similar in magnitude. There are three notable differences compared with the 
results in the main analysis: the effect on skilled occupations for women is 
significant, there is a significant gender difference for HIV prevalence, and the 
gender difference for transactional sex is not significant. 
The results obtained with the narrower window differ more, primarily due to a 
lack of statistical significance. The only strong results are for first sex among 
women, which are similar to those in the main analysis. However, the effect 
on concurrency among women is positive and statistically significant at the 
10% level, while it is statistically insignificant among men, in spite of being 
larger than the effect for women. Moreover, the effect on transactional sex is 
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insignificant for both men and women. The difference compared with in the 
main analysis is probably due to the similarity between the exposure measures 
and the linear birth-year trend, as evident in Figure 3.19 This makes it difficult 
to estimate the effects of the reform when the window is too narrow.  
In our last robustness check, we estimate logit models for the binary outcomes. 
Tables A7–A11 in Appendix II report the estimated marginal effects. Although 
the point estimates and significance levels differ somewhat, overall, the results 
are similar to those in the main analysis.  
 
5.3 Why do we get different HIV results than De Neve et al. (2015)? 
De Neve et al. (2015) find that the school reform reduced HIV infection for 
both men and women (and their estimated reduced form effect is very similar 
in magnitude between the genders). De Neve et al. (2015) use a sharp cut-off 
similar to our Exposure 1. As opposed to them, we find no statistically 
significant impact on men. 
Apart from the use of Exposure 2, our estimations differ from De Neve et al. 
(2015) in two important ways: we have an additional survey, from 2013, and 
we do not include people who were 6–9 or 21 years old in 1996 in our 
estimation sample. To investigate why our results differ, we first removed the 
2013 survey from our sample and then included those of age 6–9 or 21 in 1996 
in the sample.  
Table 8 shows that removing the 2013 survey does not change our estimated 
results for men in any meaningful way, though the estimates for women 
become more negative. However, when we include the 6–9 and 21 year olds in 
the sample (Table 9), the estimates for men become significant and similar to 
those in De Neve et al. (2015) in the specification with a linear trend or with 
survey dummies.20  
  
                                                          
19 While Exposure 1 differ more from a linear trend, we believe that it is a less accurate 
description of true exposure probabilities.  
20 Excluding the 2013 survey and keeping the 6–9 and 21 year olds give almost the same 
results as those reported in Table 9. See table A12 in Appendix II. 
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Table 8: Removing the 2013 survey.  
 Women  Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure 1  -0.075** -0.068** -0.075** -0.023 -0.018* -0.023 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) 
N 3,405 3,405 3,405 2,600 2,600 2,600 
Exposure 2  -0.149*** -0.121** -0.149*** -0.033 -0.028 -0.033 
 (0.042) (0.047) (0.042) (0.029) (0.019) (0.029) 
N 3,405 3,405 3,405 2,600 2,600 2,600 
Control for 
age in 
1996 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Exposure 1 assumes that everyone was in their age-appropriate grade at the time of the reform, 
and Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of being exposed to 
the reform based on age and gender in 1996. All regressions have a full set of age dummies 
and district fixed effects. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the birth year. 
Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 9: Including 6–9 and 21 year olds in the sample.  
 Women  Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure 1  -0.079*** -0.058** -0.078*** -0.042** -0.003 -0.041** 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.018) 
N 6,121 6,121 6,121 4,814 4,814 4,814 
Exposure 2  -0.100*** -0.079** -0.097*** -0.066*** -0.009 -0.066*** 
 (0.021) (0.032) (0.020) (0.019) (0.037) (0.020) 
N 6,121 6,121 6,121 4,814 4,814 4,814 
Control for 
age in 1996 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Exposure 1 assumes that everyone was in their age-appropriate grade at the time of the reform, 
and Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of being exposed to 
the reform based on age and gender in 1996. All regressions have a full set of age dummies 
and district fixed effects. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the birth year. 
Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper uses an education reform in Botswana to analyse the link between 
education and sexual behaviour and HIV infection among women and men, 
focusing on gender differences. The education reform increased school 
attainment from nine to ten years for a large share of students and makes it 
possible to evaluate causal effects of increased schooling. We estimate the 
reduced form impact of the reform and find a difference in responses between 
women and men. Women delay their sexual debut by about a year, while the 
response among men is small and not statistically significant. Instead, men 
engage more in transactional sex and more often have concurrent relationships, 
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while there are no such responses among women. The differences in sexual 
behaviour response to education is in line with theoretical predictions from a 
simple model. Finally, the increase in schooling appears to be protective 
against HIV infection among women, while we find no statistically significant 
impact on men.  
Using different datasets, Borkum (2009) shows that the school reform 
improved wages and employment. We find that the school reform increased 
occupational skill levels for both men and women, supporting the findings of 
Borkum (2009). Our results are therefore consistent with earlier studies 
showing that higher income increases men’s risky sex (Kohler and Thornton, 
2011; Robinson and Yeh, 2011; Burke et al., 2015).  
HIV infection does not only depend on own behaviour but also on the 
behaviour of sex partners. Women have partners who, on average, are 5 years 
older, implying that most of the partners to women in our sample were not 
exposed to the education reform. While men tend to have younger partners, the 
age gap is small (0.5 years) for young men but then grows with age to 5–6 
years for men around age 30. Hence, exposure to the education reform among 
sex partners varies more among men than among women. The correlation of 
exposure to the reform between men and their female partners is far from 
perfect, but men who were exposed to the reform tend to have female sex 
partners who also were exposed. This could be one explanation why the impact 
of the reform on men’s HIV infection is not positive in spite of their increased 
sexual risk behaviour. Another reason could be that men reduce risk-taking in 
other ways. For example, while better-educated men seem to engage more in 
transactional sex and concurrency, they could also increase condom use.  
De Neve et al. (2015) find a protective effect of the education reform on HIV 
infections for both men and women. The main reason why our findings differ 
from theirs is the number of birth-year cohorts included in the estimation 
sample; in particular, the youngest individuals in our sample were 10 years old 
in 1996, while De Neve et al. (2015) include individuals who were 6 years old 
in 1996. There are advantages and disadvantages of including more birth 
cohorts in the estimation sample: using more birth cohorts increases the 
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possibility to identify an effect of the education reform that differs from a birth-
year cohort trend. However, it also implies comparing individuals who are less 
similar to each other. For example, many of those who were 6–9 years old in 
1996 initiated their sex life after the roll-out of Botswana’s mass antiretroviral 
therapy programme, which took off around 2004 (Center of Global 
Development, 2019).  
We used two measures of exposure to the education reform, one that assumed 
perfect age-appropriate grade placement and one that used information on what 
grade children of different ages were in in 1995 (the year before the reform) to 
compute probabilities of exposure to the reform. In general, the results were 
similar for the two types of measures. However, point estimates are 
consistently larger for the second measure. This is in line with more 
measurement error and attenuation bias when exposure probabilities are 
computed assuming perfect age-appropriate grade placement.   
Keeping girls in school is currently considered a powerful HIV prevention 
method in policy circles (UNAIDS, 2015a, 2015b; United Nations, 2016; 
World Bank, 2016) and academics (Remme, et al., 2012), and large 
investments have been devoted to this end (PEPFAR, 2016). The evidence 
from Botswana arguably supports this view. However, it also casts some doubt 
on the optimism of Remme et al. (2015), who argue that investment in the 
expansion of secondary education could provide both education and an HIV-
free future. Men and women infect each other, so if increased schooling 
increases sexual risk-taking among men, the positive effect on women might 
be reduced or annulled in the long run, particularly if delayed sexual debut is 
a main reason for the decline in HIV infections. On the other hand, focusing 
on the education of girls only might not be a defensible strategy in a context 
where young women are at least as educated as young men, which is now the 
case in Botswana and several other southern African countries. Thus, young 
men’s education should be encouraged, but additional policies are needed that 
address norms about sexual risk-taking and related issues; just attending school 
might not have an automatic beneficial impact on all. One potentially effective 
approach to alter the impact of education on sexual behaviour and HIV is to 
implement or improve life skills education programmes. Past experiences are 
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disappointing, but a lot has been learned and life skills education programmes 
that use a genuinely educational approach to HIV and sex, while emphasising 
gender, power and human rights, have shown some promise (Haberland and 
Rogow, 2015; Aggleton et al., 2018). 
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Appendix I. Theoretical model 
In this section, we develop a simple model to fix ideas for the empirical 
analysis. The aim is to highlight the difference between the genders and to 
guide our analysis of links between education and HIV. More thorough and 
comprehensive models on HIV transmission can be found in for example 
Greenwood et al. (2013), Duflo et al. (2015) and Yao (2016).  
We assume that the model has two types of individuals: women and men. We 
also assume two periods: adolescence and adulthood. Risky sex is the only 
choice variable. In particular, we do not model educational choice, since we 
aim to study an exogenous increase in education. Instead we use a simple 
approach were we reason about the impacts of an exogenous increase in 
education on the terms in the first-order conditions for optimal risky sex.21 In 
each period, the individual engages in risky sex if the marginal benefit of doing 
so is perceived to be higher than the marginal cost. Risky sex provides direct 
utility, but it also has consequences on i) transfers of resources to or from 
partners, ii) the probability of pregnancy and iii) the risk of HIV infection. 
The first period’s utility depends on consumption, 𝑐𝑐1, and risky sex, 𝐸𝐸1. The 
benefits and costs of having children and getting infected with HIV are not 
experienced until adulthood.  
(1)      𝑈𝑈1 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐1) + 𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘(𝐸𝐸1) 
𝐸𝐸() and 𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘() are both concave functions. The superscript k indicates that the 
utility of risky sex could differ between genders. The first period budget 
constraint is: 
(2)     𝑐𝑐1 = 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘(𝐸𝐸1)  
where 𝑦𝑦1 is exogenously given income (or perhaps transfers from the family) 
and 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘(𝐸𝐸1) are transfers to and from sex partners (𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚(𝐸𝐸1) ≤ 0 for men).  
                                                          
21 Yao (2016) develops a general equilibrium model with endogenous education. 
38 
 
The second period’s utility depends on the presence of children and HIV 
infection in addition to consumption and risky sex.  
(3) 𝑈𝑈2 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐2) + 𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘(𝐸𝐸2) + 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(𝐸𝐸1, 𝐸𝐸2) − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐸𝐸1, 𝐸𝐸2), 
where 𝜔𝜔 is the utility of children and 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(𝐸𝐸1, 𝐸𝐸2) the probability of having 
children. This probability depends positively on unprotected sex in both 
adolescence and adulthood. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is the disutility of being HIV infected, and 
𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐸𝐸1, 𝐸𝐸2) is the probability of getting infected with HIV. The second period 
budget constraint differs between the sexes. For women it is:  
(4)  𝑐𝑐2 = 𝑦𝑦2 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(𝐸𝐸1 )) + 𝜏𝜏𝑤𝑤(𝐸𝐸2) − 𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(𝐸𝐸1, 𝐸𝐸2), 
where 𝑦𝑦2 is exogenously given income and 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤 is return to education. If a 
woman becomes pregnant in adolescence, she has to drop out of school, 
implying that she loses the return to education. The term 𝜏𝜏𝑤𝑤(𝐸𝐸2) represents 
transfers from sex partners, and 𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤 is the cost of having children. The cost of 
having children is higher for women than men, since women typically have a 
higher opportunity cost of childbearing and childrearing. The second-period 
budget constraint for men is:  (5)       𝑐𝑐2 = 𝑦𝑦2 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚(𝐸𝐸2) − 𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(𝐸𝐸1, 𝐸𝐸2) 
Men receive the return to education even if unprotected sex in adolescence 
leads to pregnancy. 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚(𝐸𝐸2) is negative, i.e. men transfer resources to sex 
partners. 𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 < 𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤 primarily because they do not face an opportunity cost 
component. The extent to which men take financial responsibility for children 
will vary and 𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 could be zero if men take no such responsibility.  
The individual maximises utility with respect to adolescent and adult risky 
sexual behaviour. In adolescence, the second period’s utility is discounted with 
the discount factor 𝛽𝛽.  
The first-order condition for women’s adolescence sexual behaviour is then:  
(6) 𝐸𝐸´(𝑐𝑐1) 𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1 + 𝛽𝛽𝜔𝜔 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1 = 𝛽𝛽 �𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1 +
𝜃𝜃
𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(∙)
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1
+ 𝐸𝐸´(𝑐𝑐2)𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1 � 
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The terms on the left-hand side are benefits of risky sex: utility from partners’ 
transfers, from the risky sex itself and from having children. The terms on the 
right-hand side are costs of risky sex: loss of the return to education if having 
to drop out of school, utility loss of HIV infection and the utility loss from the 
cost of having children.  
The first-order condition for risky sex among adolescent men is:  
(7) 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚(∙)
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1
+ 𝛽𝛽𝜔𝜔 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(∙)
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1
= −𝐸𝐸´(𝑐𝑐1) 𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1 + 𝛽𝛽 �𝜃𝜃 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1 +
𝐸𝐸´(𝑐𝑐2)𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1 � 
Note that the transfer term is a cost for men and that men do not face the cost 
of school dropout if risky sex leads to pregnancy.  
The first-order condition for adult women’s sexual behaviour is:  
(8) 𝐸𝐸´(𝑐𝑐2) 𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠2 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠2 + 𝜔𝜔 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠2 = 𝜃𝜃 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠2 + 𝐸𝐸´(𝑐𝑐2)𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠2 . 
The first-order condition for adult men’s sexual behaviour is:  
(9) 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚(∙)
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠2
+ 𝜔𝜔 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(∙)
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠2
= −𝐸𝐸´(𝑐𝑐2) 𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠2 + 𝜃𝜃 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠2 +
𝐸𝐸´(𝑐𝑐2)𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠2 . 
 
The impact of increased education 
Next, we consider how increased education due to the reform affects the 
different terms in the first-order conditions. Let us start with adolescent 
women. On the cost side, the term 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤
𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(∙)
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1
  becomes more important, since 
pregnancy and school dropout are more costly during the extra year. Pregnancy 
and the resulting school dropout is more costly both because women need to 
stay in school for one more year to get the junior certificate and because the 
extra year may raise their future earnings conditional on completing it (if 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝑤𝑤increases with the extra year). The perceived risks and consequences of HIV 
could also change, but it is unclear in which direction, and we have no reason 
to expect this term to respond differently for women and for men. The term 
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𝐸𝐸´(𝑐𝑐2)𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠1  is not affected, since if women do get pregnant in adolescence 
they do not complete their education.  
On the benefit side, the value of the transfer changes if school attendance 
affects income from other sources than sex partners. If, for example, school 
attendance has an opportunity cost, the value of the transfer increases. This 
would increase the motivation for risky sex among young women   
Let us turn to adolescent sexual behaviour among men. On the cost side, there 
is again a possible effect through changes in perceived risks and consequences 
of HIV, but the sign is ambiguous, and as already mentioned in the section on 
adolescent women, there is no reason to expect this effect to differ between 
women and men. If education reduces income while in school, for example 
since education has an opportunity cost, the value of transfers increases, which 
should reduce risky sex. To the extent that men take financial responsibility for 
children conceived in their youth (𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 > 0), their expected higher earnings 
make the cost of having children more affordable.  
Turning to the first-order condition for adult sexual behaviour, for adults the 
additional education due to the reform is expected to increase earnings, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘. 
This implies that the utility value of the transfer, 𝐸𝐸´(𝑐𝑐2) 𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠2 , is smaller, which 
should decrease risky sex among women and increase it among men. The value 
of the cost of children, 𝐸𝐸´(𝑐𝑐2)𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ℎ(∙)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠2 , also decreases. However, women also 
face a higher opportunity cost of having children. Thus, risky sex is expected 
to increase for men, while it is unclear whether the income or opportunity cost 
effect dominates for women. Either way, because of the opportunity cost, 
women are expected to respond in a less risky way than men.  
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Appendix II: Robustness checks 
 
Robustness check 1: Testing placebo reforms implemented from three years 
before to three years after the actual reform 
 
Figure A1: The impact of fictional reforms on age at first sex using 
Exposure 1 (coefficients and 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Notes: Exposure 1 assumes that everyone is in their age-appropriate grade. All 
regressions have a full set of age dummies and district fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the birth year.  
 
Figure A2: The impact of fictional reforms on age at first sex using 
Exposure 2 (coefficients and 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Notes: Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of being 
exposed to the reform based on gender and age in 1996. All regressions have a full set 
of age dummies and district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the birth year.  
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Figure A3: The impact of fictional reforms on concurrency using 
Exposure 1 (coefficients and 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Notes: Exposure 1 assumes that everyone is in their age-appropriate grade. All 
regressions have a full set of age dummies and district fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the birth year.  
 
Figure A4: The impact of fictional reforms on concurrency using 
Exposure 2 (coefficients and 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Notes: Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of being 
exposed to the reform based on gender and age in 1996. All regressions have a full set 
of age dummies and district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the birth year.  
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Figure A5: The impact of fictional reforms on transactional sex 
using Exposure 1 (coefficients and 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Notes: Exposure 1 that everyone is in their age-appropriate grade. All 
regressions have a full set of age dummies and district fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the birth year.  
 
Figure A6: The impact of fictional reforms on transactional sex 
using Exposure 2 (coefficients and 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Notes: Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of being 
exposed to the reform based on gender and age in 1996. All regressions have a full set 
of age dummies and district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the birth year.  
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Figure A7: The impact of fictional reforms on having a skilled occupation 
using Exposure 1 (coefficients and 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Notes: Exposure 1 assumes that everyone is in their age-appropriate grade. All 
regressions have a full set of age dummies and district fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the birth year.  
 
Figure A8: The impact of fictional reforms on having a skilled 
occupation using Exposure 2 (coefficients and 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Notes: Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of being 
exposed to the reform based on gender and age in 1996. All regressions have a full set 
of age dummies and district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the birth year.  
  
-.1
0
.1
.2
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Women Men
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Women Men
45 
 
Figure A9: The impact of fictional reforms on HIV infection using 
Exposure 1 (coefficients and 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Notes: Exposure 1 assumes that everyone is in their age-appropriate grade. All 
regressions have a full set of age dummies and district fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the birth year.  
 
Figure A10: The impact of fictional reforms on HIV infection using 
Exposure 2 (coefficients and 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Notes: Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of being 
exposed to the reform based on gender and age in 1996. All regressions have a full set 
of age dummies and district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the birth year.  
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Robustness check 2a: Using a wider age in 1996 window (ages 9–21) 
 
Table A1: The impact of the school reform on age at first sex, concurrency 
and transactional sex in the broader sample 
 First sex Concurrency Transactional sex 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Expos
ure 1  
0.892*** 0.631** -0.006 0.083** 0.005 0.018*** 
 (0.218) (0.266) (0.018) (0.035) (0.005) (0.004) 
N 4,523 3,279 4,217 3,380 5,171 3,975 
Expos
ure 2  
0.892*** 0.631** 0.008 0.135** 0.011 0.030*** 
 (0.218) (0.266) (0.020) (0.048) (0.008) (0.008) 
N 4,523 3,279 4,217 3,380 5,171 3,975 
Contr
ol for 
age in 
1996 
Linear 
trend 
Linear 
trend 
Linear 
trend 
Linear 
trend 
Linear 
trend 
Linear 
trend 
Notes: Exposure 1 assumes that everyone was in their age-appropriate grade at the time of the 
reform, and Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education Statistics to compute the probability of being 
exposed to the reform based on age and gender in 1996. All regressions have a full set of age 
dummies and district fixed effects. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the birth 
year. Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Table A2: The impact of the school reform on skilled occupations and 
HIV in the broader sample 
 Skilled occupation HIV 
 Women Men Women Men 
Exposure 1  0.086*** 0.086*** -0.059** 0.011 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) 
N 2,902 3,408 4,841 3,795 
Exposure 2  0.139*** 0.111** -0.083** 0.022 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
N 2,902 3,408 4,841 3,795 
Control for 
age in 1996 Linear trend Linear trend Linear trend Linear trend 
Notes: See Table A1. 
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Table A3: Testing the statistical significance of gender differences in the 
broader sample 
 
First sex  Concurrency  Transactional sex 
Skilled 
occupation  HIV 
Exposure 1  0.371 -0.089** -0.013 -0.000 -0.069** 
 (0.243) (0.032) (0.007) (0.031) (0.028) 
N 7,802 7,597 9,146 6,310 8,636 
Exposure 2  0.260 -0.128** -0.020 0.028 -0.105** 
 (0.380) (0.047) (0.013) (0.042) (0.047) 
N 7,802 7,597 9,146 6,310 8,636 
Control for 
age in 1996 Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear  
Notes: All models are fully interacted. They include a full set of age dummies, district fixed 
effects, one exposure model, a female dummy and interaction terms between the female 
dummy and all other variables. Only the interaction terms between the exposure measure and 
the female dummy are reported in the table. Exposure 1 assumes that everyone was in their 
age-appropriate grade at the time of the reform, and Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education 
Statistics to compute the probability of being exposed to the reform based on age and gender 
in 1996. Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Robustness check 2b: Using a narrower age in 1996 window (ages 11 to 19) 
Table A4: The impact of the school reform on age at first sex, concurrency and 
transactional sex in the narrow sample 
 First sex Concurrency Transactional sex 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Exposure 1  0.735*** -0.314 0.057* 0.063 -0.015 0.001 
 (0.185) (0.204) (0.026) (0.069) (0.012) (0.016) 
N 3,388 2,419 3,093 2,426 3,818 2,905 
Exposure 2  1.466*** -0.168 0.071* 0.117 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.197) (0.630) (0.036) (0.107) (0.022) (0.027) 
N 3,388 2,419 2,323 1,813 3,818 2,905 
Control for 
age in 1996 Linear trend 
Linear 
trend Linear trend 
Linear 
trend Linear trend 
Linear 
trend 
Notes: See Table A1.  
 
Table A5: The impact of the school reform on skilled occupations and 
HIV in the narrow sample 
 Skilled occupation HIV 
 Women Men Women Men 
Exposure 1  0.038 0.156** -0.047 0.052* 
 (0.030) (0.048) (0.059) (0.023) 
N 2,154 2,489 3,535 2,731 
Exposure 2  0.097* 0.136 -0.060 0.048 
 (0.043) (0.077) (0.069) (0.057) 
N 2,154 2,489 3,535 2,731 
Control for 
age in 1996 Linear trend Linear trend Linear trend Linear trend 
Notes: See Table A1.  
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Table A6: Testing the statistical significance of gender differences in narrow 
sample 
 
First sex  Concurrency  
Transactiona
l  
Skilled 
occupation  HIV 
Exposure 1  1.050*** -0.006 -0.016 -0.119 -0.099* 
 (0.285) (0.081) (0.016) (0.066) (0.049) 
N 5,807 5,519 6,723 4,643 6,266 
Exposure 2  1.634** -0.046 -0.006 -0.039 -0.108 
 (0.560) (0.121) (0.033) (0.089) (0.101) 
N 5,807 5,519 6,723 4,643 6,266 
Control for 
age in 1996 Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear  
Notes: All models are fully interacted. They include a full set of age dummies, district fixed 
effects, one exposure model, a female dummy and interaction terms between the female 
dummy and all other variables. Only the interaction terms between the exposure measure and 
the female dummy are reported in the table. Exposure 1 assumes that everyone was in their 
age-appropriate grade at the time of the reform, and Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education 
Statistics to compute the probability of being exposed to the reform based on age and gender 
in 1996. Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Robustness check 3: Estimating logit models 
 
Table A7: The impact of the school reform on concurrency (logit marginal effects) 
 Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure 1  -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 0.049 0.049 0.049 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
N 3,713 3,713 3,713 2,973 2,973 2,973 
Exposure 2  -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 0.097 0.097 0.097 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
N 3,713 3,713 3,713 2,973 2,973 2,973 
Control for 
age in 1996 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Notes: See Table A1.  
 
Table A8: The impact of the school reform on transactional sex (logit marginal effects) 
 Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure 1  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) 
N 4,100 4,100 4,100 2,732 2,732 2,732 
Exposure 2  0.016 0.016 0.014 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.070*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) 
N 4,100 4,100 4,100 2,732 2,732 2,732 
Control for 
age in 1996 Linear trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies Linear trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Notes: See Table A1.  
 
Table A9: The impact of the school reform on having a skilled occupation (logit marginal 
effects) 
 Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure 1  0.034 0.034 0.035 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.094*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) 
N 2,533 2,533 2,533 2,982 2,982 2,982 
Exposure 2  0.079** 0.079** 0.077** 0.108** 0.108** 0.111** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) 
N 2,533 2,533 2,533 2,982 2,982 2,982 
Control for 
age in 1996 Linear trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Notes: See Table A1.   
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Table A10: The impact of the school reform on HIV infection (logit marginal effects) 
 Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure 1  -0.058** -0.058** -0.059** -0.024 -0.024 -0.027 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
N 4,288 4,288 4,288 3,348 3,348 3,348 
Exposure 2  -0.093** -0.093** -0.090* -0.047 -0.047 -0.048 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
N 4,288 4,288 4,288 3,348 3,348 3,348 
Control for 
age in 1996 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Notes: See Table A1.  
 
Table A11: Testing the statistical significance of gender differences 
 Concurrency  Transactional sex  Skilled occupation  HIV 
Exposure 1  -0.086*** -0.022**a -0.069* -0.016 
 (0.033) (0.011) (0.041) (0.034) 
N 6,686 7,455 5,515 7,636 
Exposure 2  -0.131*** -0.027 -0.051 -0.014 
 (0.047) (0.021) (0.076) (0.061) 
N 6,686 7,455 5,515 7,636 
Control for 
age in 
1996 
Linear Linear Linear Linear  
Notes: All models are fully interacted. They include a full set of age dummies, district fixed 
effects, one exposure model, a female dummy and interaction terms between the female 
dummy and all other variables. Only the interaction terms between the exposure measure 
and the female dummy are reported in the table. Exposure 1 assumes that everyone was in 
their age-appropriate grade at the time of the reform, and Exposure 2 uses 1995 Education 
Statistics to compute the probability of being exposed to the reform based on age and 
gender in 1996.Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
a) The Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm was used for maximisation instead of Stata’s 
default, the Newton-Raphson algorithm 
 
Table A12: With 6–9 year olds and 21 year olds in the sample and without BAIS 2013 
 Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure 1  -0.072** -0.075** -0.072** -0.036* -0.014 -0.036* 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) 
N 4,272 4,272 4,272 3,322 3,322 3,322 
Exposure 2  -0.102*** -0.111** -0.097*** -0.057* -0.011 -0.057* 
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.020) (0.030) (0.044) (0.030) 
N 4,272 4,272 4,272 3,322 3,322 3,322 
Control for 
age in 1996 
Linear 
trend 
Quadratic 
trend 
Survey 
dummies Linear trend 
Quadrati
c trend 
Survey 
dummies 
Notes: See Table A1.  
 
 
